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EVALUATING  EDUCATION  POLICIES  WHEN  THE  RATE  OF
RETURN  VARIES  ACROSS  INDIVIDUALS
PEDRO CARNEIRO*
1. INTRODUCTION
In this paper I summarize some recent developments in the literature on the
econometrics of program evaluation. In particular, I consider the estimation of
mean and distributional treatment effects when the impact of the program varies
across individuals. I focus the exposition on the study of the returns to education
(therefore, education is the program being considered). I provide examples of two
sets of papers that illustrate the theoretical and practical importance of accounting
for heterogeneity in program evaluation. The research summarized in this paper
has general applicability. It is not limited to the study of education. Instead of
education (as the “program’’ being considered) we could use the framework to
analyze job training, unionism, migration, medical care, and other types of programs.
2. EVALUATING PROGRAMS - MEANS AND DISTRIBUTIONS
Take the standard model of potential outcomes:
(1)
0 0 0
1 1 1
U ) X ( Y
U ) X ( Y
+ m =
+ m =
where Y1 and Y 0 are potential outcomes, say wages, under two different states,
which are high school and college in this paper. X is a vector of observable
variables (such as experience and test scores) and U 1 and U 0 are mean zero
unobservables.1  The gain of going from high school to college is the return to
college:
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1 Separability between X and U
S is not essential to all of the methods developed in this
paper. Alternatively, we could have:
) U , X ( Y
) U , X ( Y
0 0 0
1 1 1
m =
m =
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However, for simplicity and for easier exposition I will continue with the separable
case. I refer the reader to the papers referenced throughout the discussion, in particular
Heckman and Vytlacil (2000, 2003), and Carneiro, Heckman and Vytlacil (2001).
(2)
0 1 0 1
0 1
U U ) X ( ) X (
Y Y
- + m - m =
- = b
Returns can vary across individuals because of both X and (U1, U0). The
college decision equation (decision equation) is the following:
(3) 0 U ) Z , X ( if 1 S S S > - m =
where Z are variables that influence the decision to enroll in college but not the
potential outcomes:
(4) Z ^^ U1, U0, US | X
(these are usually called instrumental variables; some examples in the literature on
the returns to schooling are distance to college and tuition). In the empirical work
reported in the next sections it is also assumed that
(5) X ^^   US
(although this assumption is not essential for the analysis; see Heckman and
Vytlacil, 2000, 2003).  US is unobservable and mean zero. For each person, we only
observe potential wages in the state that is actually chosen. For example, if a
person is a college graduate, we do not observe the wages he would have earned
had he not gone to college. Equation (3) is the reduced form for a general economic
model of schooling (with income or utility maximizing agents). Observed wages
are:
(6)
0 0
0 0 1 0 1 0
0 1
U ) X ( S ) X (
U ] ) U U ( ) X ( ) X ( [ S ) X (
Y ) S 1 ( SY Y
+ b + m =
+ - + m - m + m =
- + =
where  ). U U ( ) X ( ) X ( ) X ( 0 1 0 1 - + m - m = b   For each person we either observe Y1 or Y0,
but not both, and therefore we cannot compute b =Y1 - Y0.
The traditional approach to the estimation of (6) assumes that U1 = Y0 and
therefore, conditional on X, everybody has the same return to college (see for
example, Griliches, 1977):
) X ( ) X ( ) X ( ) X ( 0 1 m - m = b = b
In this case (6) becomes
0 0 U ) X ( S ) X ( Y + b + m =
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The econometric problem in this equation is that S may be correlated with
U0, which is usually called the ability bias problem. The solution is to find an
instrument Z for schooling, a variable correlated with S but not with U0. Then we
can estimate  ), X ( b which is the same for every individual (conditional on X). The
distribution of returns conditional on X is degenerate at  ), X ( b and once we remove
the conditioning on X, it is just the distribution of a function of X. There is no
heterogeneity in returns conditional on X, even though there may still be substantial
heterogeneity in returns in the population because of X.  Suppose that one of the
variables in X is a cognitive test score, and this is an important determinant of both
the returns to college (through  ) X ( ) X ( 0 1 m - m ) and of the decision to attend in
college (through  ) Z , X ( S m ).  Then  ] 0 S (X) [ f ] 1 S (X) [ f = b „ = b , where f is the pdf
of b(X).
The assumption that U1 = U0 is convenient but implausible (see Heckman,
2001). If U 1„ U0 then there is another component of heterogeneity in returns,
U1 - U0, which is unobservable. In this case (6) is
) U U ( S U ) X ( S ) X ( Y 0 1 0 0 - + + b + m =
and instrumental variables no longer estimates  ), X ( b  unless (U1-U0)^^S|X (see
Heckman and Vytlacil, 2000, 2003, and Carneiro, Heckman and Vytlacil, 2001).
Furthermore, if  (U1 - U 0)  ^/^S|X it is not clear that  ), X ( b is a useful
parameter to consider. Suppose, as most of the literature does, that we focus on
mean treatment parameters, and that we want to compute the benefits of a particu-
lar policy, say, a tuition subsidy. How would we evaluate such a policy? Assume
the tuition subsidy induces K individuals to enroll in college. The traditional
approach to the problem assumes that the return to college, b, is the same for all
individuals (at least conditional on X). Then the benefit of the policy is simply
B = b * K.2  However if b varies in the population (even conditional on X) we want
to multiply K by the average return to college for those individuals induced to go
to college by the tuition subsidy, and therefore we need to know where in the
distribution of b are the new entrants coming from. Suppose we have the following
version of the model of equation (3):
S = 1  if  b - Z > 0
where b and Z vary in the population. Let Z be the tuition faced by a given
individual under no subsidy, and Z’  be the tuition he faces with the subsidy in
place.3  Then, for individuals induced to attend college by the subsidy, b - Z £ 0
2 Or, conditional on X, B(X) = b (X) K(X), where B(X) is the benefit of the policy for
individuals with a given level of X,  b (X) is the return to college for those individuals,
and K(X) is the number of such individuals induced to attend college by the subsidy.
Then  ￿ = X ). X ( B B I will drop X when convenient for simplicity of exposition.
3 There is a distribution of Z and Z’ in the population (different individuals face different
tuition levels with and without the subsidy).
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(they do not attend college without the subsidy, or S(Z) = 0, and b - Z’ > 0 (they
attend college with the subsidy, or S(Z’) = 1).  Then
) Z ' Z ( E
K * ] 1 ) S(Z' 0, S(Z) [ E B
£ b < b =
= = b =
Many of the standard parameters of the evaluation literature do not in
general equal the policy relevant treatment effect (PRTE), or  ) Z ' Z ( E £ b < b (see
Heckman and Vytlacil, 2001, 2003, and Carneiro, Heckman and Vytlacil, 2001). The
average treatment effect (ATE)\ measures the average return to college for a randomly
selected person in the population (E (b)).  Treatment on the treated (TT) is the
average return to college for those that attend college  )). Z / ( E ) 1 S ( E ( > b b = = b
Treatment on the untreated (TUT)  measures the average return that those who do
not attend college would experience had they gone to college
)). Z / ( E ) 0 S ( E ( £ b b = = b  The average marginal treatment effect (AMTE) is the effect
of treatment for individuals at the margin between enrolling in college or not
)). Z ( E ( = b b  Individuals who are at the margin will probably be more responsive
to different kinds of interventions than inframarginal individuals.
Some important evaluation questions require knowledge of features of the
distribution of returns beyond the mean parameters reported above (Heckman,
Smith and Clemens, 1997). For example, we may want to know what is the proportion
of individuals benefiting from a program (and symmetrically, what is the proportion
of individuals who lose from the program), or what is the impact of the program on
the distribution of income. Knowledge of distributions of returns allows us to
answer a much larger range of questions. We can define parameters analogous to
the mean parameters described above. f (b) is the density of b in the population,
) 1 S ( f = b is the density of b for those who enrolled in college and  ) 0 S ( f = b  is for
those who did not enroll in college.   ) Z ( f = b b  is the density of  b  for those at the
margin and  ) Z ' Z ( f £ b < b  is the density of b for those induced to enroll in college
by the tuition subsidy. Once we have the latter distribution it is possible to compu-
te, for example, the proportion of individuals affected by the policy who benefit
from the policy.
However, identification of distributions of returns is more difficult than
identification of the mean parameters discussed above. Under assumptions (4)
and (5) it is possible to identify f (Y1), f (Y0) but not f (Y1, Y 0) (see Heckman and
Smith, 1993, 1998).4  The reason is that we never observe both Y1 and Y0 for the
same individual. Therefore it is not possible to identify the different densities
listed in the previous paragraph. However it is still possible to identify the different
mean parameters described above (under some continuity and support conditions
for the instrument Z; see Heckman and Vytlacil, 2000, 2003). Identification of mean
effects is achieved under weaker conditions than identification of distributions of
4 It is possible to construct bounds for f(Y
1, Y
0), but in practical applications these
bounds turned out to be very wide (see Heckman, Smith and Clements, 1997).
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effects.5  Assuming we have the model presented above and there exists a
continuous instrument Z, it is possible to identify  ), U , X Y ( E S 1 ) U , X Y ( E S 0 and
therefore,  ) U , X Y Y ( E S 0 1-  (see, for example, Heckman and Vytlacil, 2000, 2003).
Heckman and Vytlacil (2000,2003) show how it is possible to construct parameters
such as ATE, TT, TUT, AMTE and PRTE as weighted averages of   ) U , X Y Y ( E S 0 1- ,
a parameter they call the marginal treatment effect (MTE). For example:
S S S S 0 1
S S S S 0 1
S S S S 0 1
dxdu ) 0 S u , x ( f ) u U , x X Y Y ( E ) 0 S ( E
dxdu ) 1 S u , x ( f ) u U , x X Y Y ( E ) 1 S ( E
dxdu ) u , x ( f ) u U , x X Y Y ( E ) ( E
= = = - ￿ = = b
= = = - ￿ = = b
= = - ￿ = b
where f(X, U S) is the joint density of X and U S. If it were possible to identify
) U Y Y ( f S 0 1- then by the same reasoning it would be possible to construct
f (Y1 - Y 0)  and the remaining densities I presented above. However all we can
recover from the data under the assumptions presented so far is  ) U Y ( f S 1 and
) U Y ( f S 0 Heckman and Smith, 1993, 1998), which is not enough for recovering
) U Y Y ( f S 0 1- since that requires knowledge of the joint density
). U Y , Y ( f S 0 1 Knowledge of this joint density is not necessary for constructing
the marginal treatment effect; the marginal densities provide enough information.
In section 4 I will present alternative sets of assumptions under which it is possible
to recover these densities. Once we recover the joint density of potential outcomes,
f(Y1, Y0), we can compute distributions of returns to schooling, f ( b), and different
distributional parameters, and we can also analyze the effects of different policies
on the distribution of income.
There is a large literature I could draw on and review in this summary, but
the size and scope of the paper is much smaller than a complete review of the
literature. In the next two sections I choose to summarize two sets of papers where
these ideas are applied in the estimation of the returns to schooling. Section 3
focuses on the work of Carneiro, Heckman and Vytlacil (2001) and Carneiro (2002),
papers where different mean treatment parameters are estimated. In section 4 I
discuss the work of Carneiro, Hansen and Heckman (2001, 2003) which provides
estimates of distributions of returns to schooling.
3. ESTIMATING AVERAGE RETURNS TO EDUCATION
Heckman and Vytlacil (2001, 2003) show how the marginal treatment effect
)) U , X Y Y ( E ( S 0 1- can be estimated using the method of local instrumental varia-
bles. Carneiro, Heckman and Vytlacil (2001) and Carneiro (2002) apply these ideas
5 Obviously, if we can identify distributions of effects, we can identify all the mean
effects.
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to the estimation of returns to college. The intuition of the method is best explained
with an example. Suppose the decision model has the following reduced form:
(7) 0 U Z if 1 S S> + g - =
where Z (the instrumental variable) is tuition in county of residence (g >0) and US
is ‘ability’ and it is unobserved.6
We start by using only two counties: A and B. In county A, Z = $100, and
in county B,  Z= $200. The two counties are equal in every aspect except tuition7.
We can estimate b by standard IV using tuition as the instrument and data from
only counties A and B:
) * 200 U * 100 ( E
] 0 ) 200 Z ( S , 1 ) 100 Z ( S [ E
) 200 Z S ( E ) 100 Z S ( E
) 200 Z Y (ln E ) 100 Z Y (ln E ˆ
S
200 , 100
IV
g £ < g b =
= = = = b =
= - =
= - =
= b
This is the Local Average Treatment Effect for the case where the instrument
takes values Z = $100 and Z = $200 (Imbens and Angrist, 1994).  It is the average
return for individuals who go to college if Z = $100 but do not go if Z =$200.
Therefore these individuals are at the margin between going to college or not if
they face a Z that is between 100 and 200. The fact that they are at the margin at
such a low level of tuition means that they have low ability (US).8
Suppose we use two different counties. County C has Z=$2100 and county
D has Z=$2200. Using C and D only:
) * 2200 U * 2100 ( E
] 0 ) 2200 Z ( S , 1 ) 2100 Z ( S [ E
) 2200 Z S ( E ) 2100 Z S ( E
) 2200 Z Y (ln E ) 2100 Z Y (ln E ˆ
S
2200 , 2100
IV
g £ < g b =
= = = = b =
= - =
= - =
= b
6 The unobservable does not have to be “ability’’. I call it ability for simplicity but U
S
can represent any unobservable (ex: unobservable cost).
7 Tuition can vary across counties if there are barriers to student migration. Tuition
variation could also reflect quality variation which would invalidate the use of tuition
as an instrumental variable but we abstract from quality considerations in this example
and in the rest of the paper. For an example see Carneiro and Heckman (2002).
8 If individuals switch when tuition varies vary little at such a low range then that means
that even though they are facing tuition at a very low level these individuals still decide
not to enroll in college unless tuition decreases to an even lower level. Therefore they
are likely to have low levels of ability (or high levels of unobserved cost).
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This is the average return for individuals who do not go to school if
Z = $2200 but who decide to enroll if Z = $2100. They are at the margin at a high
level of tuition, which means that they have a high level of ability.
The general expression for any pair of counties with tuition (z, z’) is:
(8)
) * ' z U * z ( E
] 0 ) ' z Z ( S , 1 ) z Z ( S [ E
) ' z Z S ( E ) z Z S ( E
) ' z Z Y (ln E ) z Z Y (ln E ˆ
S
' z , z
IV
g £ < g b =
= = = = b =
= - =
= - =
= b
We can make z and z’ “close” and get
) z U / ( E S g = b
By varying Z we can trace out how b varies with US.  This is the MTE.
Notice that to trace out the whole support of US we need large support for the
instrument. In practical applications of the method we can have many instruments.
We aggregate them into a single index through a regular first stage regression
such as (7), where Z can be a vector of instrumental variables. It is convenient to
pick the index to be the predicted probability of attending college conditional on Z.
Let  ) Z ( F ) Z 1 S ( Pr ) Z ( P , U U ' S U s ' S g - = = = - =  and  ) U ( F V '
S U S 'S = where  ) • ( F 'S U is the cdf
of   ). U ( ' S
9  These are just monotonic transformation of variables (see Heckman
and Vytlacil, 2001, 2003). The choice model becomes:
(9) S  = 1  if P(Z) > VS
and (8) becomes:
' p p
) ' p P Y (ln E ) p P Y (ln E
) ' p P S ( E ) p P S ( E
) ' p P Y (ln E ) p P Y (ln E ˆ ' p , p
IV
-
= - =
=
= - =
= - =
= b
Notice that this is similar to the expression for a derivative (once you take
the limit). On the numerator we have the difference of a function of P (E (ln Y|P))
evaluated at two different values, p and p’.  In the numerator we have the difference
between p and p’.  This suggests that an estimator of MTE is simply:
9 These are just monotonic transformation of variables (see Heckman and Vytlacil,
2001, 2003). The choice model becomes:
S  = 1  if P(Z) > V
S.
Notice that V
S needs to be read in the opposite way as U
S: the higher the U
S (the higher
the unobserved ability or benefit, or the lower the unobserved cost), the lower the V
S.
Individuals with low V
S are more likely to go to college than individuals with high U
S.
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P
) P / Y (ln E
¶
¶
 P=p
= E(Y1 - Y0 | VS = p )
(for a formal proof see Heckman and Vytlacil, 2000, 2003). Finally, we can construct
the different mean treatment parameters as weighted averages of the MTE. For
example:
n < £ n n = - ￿ = < £ - d ) P V ' P / ( f ) V | Y Y ( E ) P V ' P | Y Y ( E S S 0 1 S 0 1
) P V ' P / ( f S < £ n can be easily constructed from equation (9) since we observe
f(P, P’)  in the data and by construction VS is a uniform random variable independent
of P (see Heckman and Vytlacil, 2000, 2003; Carneiro, Heckman and Vytlacil, 2001;
Carneiro, 2002).10
Adding X to the model is a simple (but important) extension. Carneiro,
Heckman and Vytlacil (2001) estimate ) V , X Y Y ( E S 0 1- using white males from
NLSY7911 with a high school degree (S = 0) or above (S = 1). Wages are measured
in 1992. The relevant variable in X is AFQT scores, which is an important determinant
of the return to college. The instrumental variables Z are number of siblings, father‘s
education, distance to college, tuition and local labor market variables. These
estimates correspond to returns to one year of college, and are obtained by dividing
gross returns by 3.5, the difference in the average years of schooling for individuals
that attend college and those that do not. Figure 1 shows the estimate of
) V , X Y Y ( E S 0 1- .  Returns are highest for individuals with the highest level of
AFQT scores and the lowest level of VS  (notice that the lowest VS  the more likely
is an individual to attend college).12  The relationship between  ) V , X Y Y ( E S 0 1- and
VS is not monotonic. Returns are decreasing with VS for low values of this variable
indicating that individuals who are more likely to attend college have higher returns.
However, returns are increasing with VS for high values of VS.  Some individuals
have high returns and still do not enroll in college. This may happen if they face
high psychic costs of schooling or if they are credit constrained. A simple formal
test for selection rejects the null hypothesis that  ) V , X Y Y ( E S 0 1- does not vary
with VS (i.e., that selection on unobservables is not important). Table 1 shows
estimates of ATE, TT, TUT, AMTE and PRTE.13  The simulated policy is a $1000
tuition subsidy. The table also present OLS and linear IV estimates of the returns
to college, where the instrument is P. Neither ATE, TT or TUT correspond to PRTE.
AMTE is very similar to PRTE. OLS and linear IV do not estimate any of the above
10 By assumption, P, P’ are independent of V
S.
11 NLSY79 is the 1979 National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (see BLS, 2001).
12 Recall that  ), U ( F V '
S U S 'S = where  . U U S ' S - = Therefore, V
S is negatively correlated
with U
S (if U
S is ability, then a if an individual has a high level of V
S then that means that
he has low ability). This transformation is only done for notational simplicity.
13 Ichimura and Taber (2001) suggest an alternative estimator of policy effects, which
they apply in the estimation of the effects of tuition subsidies.
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4. ESTIMATING DISTRIBUTIONS OF RETURNS TO EDUCATION
The estimation of distributions of returns is more complex. Heckman and
Smith (1993, 1998) and Heckman, Smith and Clemens (1997) show how under
different assumptions it is possible to estimate f(Y1, Y 0) from knowledge of
f(Y1) and f(Y0).  Assuming absolutely continuous and strictly increasing marginal
distributions, they postulate that quantiles are perfectly ranked so
)) Y ( F ( F Y 0 x , 0
1
x , 1 1
- =  where  ) X y ( F F 1 1 x , 1 = and  ) X y ( F F 0 0 x , 0 = .  An alternative
assumption is that people are perfectly inversely ranked so the best in one
distribution is the worst in the other:  )) Y ( F 1 ( F Y 0 x , 0
1
x , 1 1 - = - .  More generally, one
could associate quantiles across distributions more freely. Heckman, Smith and
Clements (1997) use Markov transition kernels which stochastically map quantiles
of one distribution into quantiles of another.  They define a pair of Markov kernels
) X y , y ( M 0 1 and  ) X y , y ( M
~
1 0 such that
) X y ( dF ) X y , y ( M ) X y ( F 0 0 0 1 1 1 ￿ =
) X y ( dF ) X y , y ( M
~
) X y ( F 1 1 1 0 0 0 ￿ =
Allowing these operators to be degenerate produces a variety of
deterministic transformations, including the two previously presented, as special
cases of a general mapping. Different  ) M
~
, M ( pairs produce different joint
distributions. These stochastic or deterministic transformations supply the missing
information needed to construct the joint distributions.
A perfect ranking (or perfect inverse ranking) assumption is convenient,
but it imposes a strong and arbitrary dependence across distributions. The empirical
analysis in Carneiro, Hansen and Heckman (2003), summarized in this paper, shows
that this assumption is at odds with data on the returns to education. They
implement an alternative approach. Aakvik, Heckman and Vytlacil (1999, 2003)
build on Heckman (1990) and Heckman and Smith (1998) by postulating a factor
structure connecting (U0, U1, US). The work of Carneiro, Hansen and Heckman
(2003) builds on the analysis of Aakvik, Heckman and Vytlacil (1999, 2003) so I
describe its essential idea. Suppose that the unobservables follow a factor structure:
S S s 1 1 1 0 0 0 U , U , U e + q a = e + q a = e + q a =
where q is independent of  ) , , ( S 1 0 e e e and the  s ' e are mutually independent.
In their setup, q is a scalar q can be an unobservable trait like ability or motivation
that affects all outcomes. Because the factor loadings,  , , , S 1 0 a a a may be different,
the factors may affect outcomes and choices differently. Recall that one can
identify  ) U , U ( F s 0 and  ) U , U ( F s 1 under the conditions specified in Heckman
and Smith (1998). Thus, one can identify  2
S 0 s 0 ) U , U ( COV q s a a =
and  2
S 1 s 1 ) U , U ( COV q s a a = assuming finite variances and assuming
. ) ( E , 0 ) ( E 2 2
q s = q = q  With some normalizations  ) 1 , 1 ., g . e ( s
2 = a = sq and conditions
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specified in Carneiro, Hansen and Heckman (2003) we can nonparametrically
identify the distribution of  q and the distributions of  S 1 0 , , e e e  (the last up to
scale). With the  , , , S 1 0 a a a and the distributions of  S 1 0 , , , e e e q in hand, we can
construct the joint distribution  ) X Y , Y ( f 1 0 .14  Carneiro, Hansen and Heckman
(2003) build on this basic idea and extend it to a more general setting. They consider
a model with multiple factors, multiple treatments and multiple time periods. Outcome
measures may be discrete or continuous. They follow the psychometric literature
by adjoining measurement equations to outcome equations to pin down the
distribution of q.  In particular, they use cognitive test scores as additional measures
in the system. With this framework they can estimate all pairwise treatment effects
in a multiple outcome setting. They also consider the benefits for identification of
having access to imperfect measurements on vector q which are observed for all
persons independent of their treatment status. Their model integrates the LISREL
framework of Jöreskog (1977) into a model of discrete choice and a model of multiple
treatment effects.
Carneiro, Hansen and Heckman (2003) estimate the distribution of returns
to college using white males in NLSY79. They compute present values of earnings
for high school and college graduates, which they use as outcome measures. The
return to college for an individual is the gain in the present value of earnings from
moving him from high school to college. Figure 2 presents the estimated density of
the returns to college for high school and college graduates. College graduates
have higher returns to college than high school graduates (their density of returns
is to the right of the density of returns for high school graduates). However, notice
that a substantial portion of college graduates (7%) have negative returns to
college (14% of high school graduates have negative returns to college). Conversely,
there is a large overlap in the distributions of returns for high school and college
graduates so that a large number of high school graduates would have benefited
substantially from going to college if they had gone to college (instead of just
completing high school). In the paper there is a discussion of the reasons for so
many apparent “mistakes”, and two important lessons emerge. The first one is that
there is considerable uncertainty in the returns to college at the time the college
decision is made (ex-ante uncertainty). Therefore, the apparent “mistakes’’ just
reflect ex-post realizations of this uncertainty.15  In other words, people make
mistakes because they do not know the future with certainty and some of them get
a wage draw ex-post that is worse than the wage draw they would have had if they
had chosen another schooling level. However, the second lesson is that the most
important factor driving the college decision is utility or psychic cost of
schooling. 16 Enrollment in college has relatively little to do with ex-ante
14 Aakvik, Heckman and Vytlacil (1999) present other sets of identifying assumptions.
15 Carneiro, Hansen and Heckman (2003) estimate the amount of uncertainty in the
returns to college an individual faces at the time the college decision is made.
16 It can also be some other unobserved cost not captured by the observable variables in
our dataset.
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TABLE 2
) d PV d d PV d ( Pr 1 j h j 1 i c i + + £ < £ < where  i d is the ith decile of the college earnings
distribution and  j d is the jth decile of the high school earnings distribution*
* Thus the number in row j column i is the probability that a person with a potential high school
earnings in the j
th decile of the high school earnings distribution has potential college earnings
in the i
th decile of the college earnings distribution.
Source:  Carneiro, Hansen and Heckman (2003).
5. CONCLUSION
In this paper I summarize two sets of papers that present methods for
estimating the effects of different economic activities when these effects vary
across individuals. Even though this is far from a complete review of the literature
on evaluation, it illustrates the theoretical and empirical importance of accounting
for heterogeneity in the evaluation of different policies. The papers summarized
here provide simple examples where heterogeneity is important and of how we can
account for heterogeneity in the evaluation of different policies.
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